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A question of control? Forms 
and functions of courtroom 







Th is paper compares the questioning of witnesses and defendants in American 
and Danish courtroom interaction on the basis of one American and three 
Danish criminal trials. A total of 780 questions are analysed in terms of 
their morphosyntactic properties as well as speech act functions. Following 
a general discussion of courtroom questioning and the notions of coercion 
and control, as well as an outline of legal cultural diff erences and similarities 
between American and Danish courtroom interaction, a coding system is 
developed for the linguistic comparison, and initial quantitative results of the 
comparison are discussed. Particular attention is given to declarative questions 
and the ‘communicative’ speech act function, as the linguistic and interactional 
features of these are shown to be explored in quite diff erent ways in accordance 
with the legal and cultural contexts in which the courtroom questioning takes 
place.1
Keywords: Questioning, Morphosyntax, Courtroom interaction, Pragmatics, 
Legal cultures, Coercion, Control
1. Introduction
Nearly all literature relating to a court context, whether real or fi ctional, 
recognizes the importance of questions as the primary means of 
obtaining information from defendants, witnesses, and in fact all those 
who take the stand in a courtroom. (Harris 1984:5-6)
240
When studying questions as a linguistic and interactional phenomenon, it is 
almost as hard to ignore trial examinations as a prototypical site of questioning, 
as it is to ignore questioning when studying what goes on in a trial. Th is paper 
investigates formal and functional aspects of the questions asked by the 
lawyers and prosecutors in one American and three Danish criminal trials. 
While courtroom questioning has been extensively treated from, amongst 
others, conversation analytical (e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979), critical 
discourse analytical (e.g. Erhlich 2001) and forensic linguistic (e.g. Gibbons 
2003) perspectives, only few studies off er direct comparisons of courtroom 
questioning in different countries and legal cultures. Such comparative 
approaches – e.g. Bednarek (2014) – typically contrast the  (in)famous 
adversarial practices of Anglo-Saxon common law courts with the less 
fl amboyant, and less studied, inquisitorial trial practices of European civil law 
courts. However, Danish (and other Scandinavian) courts seem to diff use this 
basic dichotomy as they resemble Anglo-Saxon adversarial courts in terms 
of formal organisation and participation structures, but lean closer to – and 
even surpass – European inquisitorialism in terms of relaxed interactional 
atmosphere.
 Th e direct comparison off ered here of these two diff erent approaches to 
adversarial legal practice is thus an attempt to shed light not only on particular 
linguistic and interactional features of American and Danish courtroom 
questioning, but also on their strategic and legal cultural underpinnings. As 
linguistic investigations of Danish courtroom questioning are so far virtually 
non-existent, the case study has a general explorative aim, yet also a particular 
interest in one of the salient traits commonly attributed to adversarial courtroom 
questioning: lawyers’ tactical use of specifi c question types as means to control 
the interaction with their witnesses and, in eff ect, the testimony they can off er 
and the inferences that can be drawn from it by the judge and jurors listening. 
As the initial quantitative analysis points to intriguing diff erences concerning 
especially one particular question type, viz: declarative questions – a question 
type commonly regarded as highly controlling – particular attention is given 
to declarative questions and their uses and functions in the trials.
2. Understanding courtroom questioning
2.1. Control and coercion through questioning 
Ever since the peculiarities of witness examinations became a focus of 
interactional analysis (Danet et al. 1976, Atkinson 1979, Atkinson and 
Drew 1979, Dunstan 1980), the constraining and potentially coercive force 
of questions has been a key area of research in courtroom language. While 
(typically) emphasising the importance of contextual and interactional factors, 
many such studies explore the constraining force of questions as partial 
refl ections of their morphosyntactic properties (e.g. Danet and Bogoch 1980, 
Harris 1984, Woodbury 1984, Adelswärd et al. 1987, Gibbons 2003, Archer 
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2005, Mortensen 2018, Seuren 2019). From this perspective, several authors 
have proposed clines representing the degrees of control said to be exerted 
by diff erent types of questions asked by lawyers to witnesses and defendants 
during trial, e.g.:
Four basic question forms predominate in American courtrooms, as 
refl ected in our data: (1) declaratives (with or without what linguists call 
a tag at the end; e.g., “You did it, didn’t you?”); (2) interrogative yes/
no questions (“Did you do it?”) or choice questions (“Did you arrive 
at nine or at ten o’clock?”); (3) interrogative-wh questions (who-what-
where-when-why questions, as in “What did you do that night?”); and 
(4) “requestions”, which may be interpreted as literal questions about the 
condition or ability of the hearer, or, more conventionally, as indirect 
requests for information (e.g., “Could you tell us what happened that 
night?” One can either answer “Yes, I could”, or go ahead and tell.). In 
the order just presented, these four question forms range from those 
which most constrain and control the witness (or at least aspire to do 
so), to those which least constrain him/her. We view declaratives as 
the most coercive, and, on cross-examination, as combative, since they 
assert more than they ask. (Danet and Bogoch 1980:43)
Some early studies, such as the work by Danet and Bogoch, were criticised 
for not looking beyond morphosyntax and taking the interactional nature of 
questioning into account, e.g.:
… they attempt to assert a simple relationship between linguistic 
form and coercion, declaratives being stipulated as the most coercive 
questions, interrogatives as slightly less so, etcetera. Th is claim does 
not survive a preliminary and cursory consideration of how recipients 
do treat the diff ering question forms for their alleged coerciveness. 
(Dunstan 1980:65)
While scholars continue discussing how to account for contextual, pragmatic, 
interactional and extra-linguistic factors in courtroom questioning (and 
questioning in general, see e.g. Stivers 2010, Heinemann 2010), they share the 
basic assumption that the morphosyntax of questions somehow correlates with 
the degree or nature of interactional control exerted through the questions 
(Harris 1984, Schegloff  1984, Woodbury 1984, Adelswärd et al. 1987, Bülow-
Moller 1992, Luchjenbroers 1997, Gibbons 2003, Archer 2005, Gibbons 
2008, Harris 2011, Mortensen 2018, Seuren 2019). A notable outcome of 
this approach is Archer’s (2005) scalar model of courtroom question types, 
adapted from Woodbury (1984):
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Type of question Amount of 
control 
Conducivity Type of response question-type 
typically expects 
 Least Low  
1. Broad wh-   – Open range 
2. Narrow wh- – Naming of specific variable 
3. Alternative – Choice of answers restricted  
   to 1 of 2 provided by questioner 
4. Grammatical yes/no – Yes/no 
5. Negative gram yes/no – Anticipated response, whether  
   affirmative or negative 6. Declarative 
7. Tagged declarative – Confirmation of proposition 
 Most High  
Figure 1: Continuum of control in question types (Archer 2005:79) 
Th e examples below, taken mainly from the American data set (which is 
introduced in section 3.), briefl y illustrate each of the question types mentioned 
in the model:
(1) Broad wh-question
 DFL2: Okay. So, let’s talk about what happened on August 19, 2015.   
 What were you doing that night?3
 DFW: I was at home actually, and I received a call – had to be around  
 11:00 o’clock or so at night. And… [Narrative follows]
(2) Narrow wh-question
 DFL: Roughly, what time of day was it?
 DFW: Midnight-ish, or what have you
(3) Alternative question
 DFL: Do you consider yourself a “fi ght” person or a “fl ight” person?
 DFW: I beg your pardon?
(4) Grammatical yes/no-question
 DFL: Did you tell them to get away from your property?
 PRW: I did
(5) Negative grammatical yes/no-question4
 PRC: kunne du ikke mærke modstand i dine bevægelser
  ‘couldn’t you feel resistance in your movements’
 DEF: jeg kan ikke mærke øh jeg kan ikke mærke det fordi det gør   
 rigtig ondt her
  ‘I can’t feel uh I can’t feel it cause it hurts a lot here’
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(6) Declarative question
 DFL: And, to your knowledge, he had no weapons with him?
 PRW: None that I saw
(7) Tagged declarative question
 DFL: But, he was leaning out of the truck, correct?
 DFW: Leaning out of the window
At a glance, Archer’s (and Woodbury’s) model resembles the kind of scalar 
account proposed by Danet and Bogoch (1980), as quoted above. However, in 
addition to off ering a more fi ne-grained classifi cation of questions, one of its 
merits is the adoption of ‘control’, rather than ‘coercion’, as its central semantic 
variable. Many other authors prefer ‘control’ as well (see e.g. Eades 2000:168), 
while the reasons for this are never clearly addressed. ‘Coercion’, in most 
senses, implies a degree of unwillingness on the part of the coerced (e.g. www.
dictionary.cambridge.org, www.collinsdictionary.com), which is not inherent 
in ‘control’. Whether or not the respondent’s unwillingness is actually assumed 
or suggested in studies of ‘coercive’ questioning is oft en less than clear, since 
‘coercion’ and ‘control’ (and other related terms) tend to be used “more or less 
synonymously” (Eades 2000:168). In any case, the potential ‘unwillingness’ 
reading muddles the distinction between describing the controlling force 
of particular question types and describing how the exerted control may, 
in particular contexts, undermine or support the stance and agenda of the 
respondent. Further, as Bülow-Moller (1992) and Aldridge and Luchjenbroers 
(2007) illustrate, questions may be coercive, in the sense of undermining or 
framing the witness against their will, through the sheer inferences they compel 
the judge and jury to make regarding the witness and their testimony, rather 
than through the controlling force of the question types themselves. Th us, 
the notion of ‘coercion’ may entail locating the analytical attention closer to 
the respondent, while ‘control’ arguably emphasises the semantic, pragmatic 
and interactional features of the questioning itself. Th at is, Archer’s model “… 
helps us to highlight the amount of control an examiner may be attempting to 
exercise over the discourse…” (Archer 2005:78)
 Following Archer, what is being impacted by means of a particular question 
type is the discourse, including the repertoire of appropriate responses made 
available to the respondent. By centring the notion of question control at 
the level of discourse, Archer deviates from Woodbury (1984), who refers to 
control less strictly as “… the degree to which the questioner can impose his 
own interpretations on the evidence.” (Woodbury 1984:199). Th is defi nition, 
reminiscent of the understanding of ‘coercion’ discussed above, potentially 
confl ates the controlling force of questions with the possible tactical benefi ts 
the exerted control may lead to in the courtroom, contrary to Woodbury’s 
explicit interest in “… keeping separate the illocutionary force and the intended 
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or actual perlocutionary force of a given question.” (Woodbury 1984:199). 
Discursive control, as realised through questioning, may be rightly conceived 
as a – to some extent scalable – semantic feature refl ected in the morphosyntax 
of various question forms. Th e possible interactional, social and strategic 
eff ects realised through such controlling questions, which may in some cases 
be seen as coercive, are complex, context-bound features dependent not only 
on the discursive constraints exerted by the question type itself, but also 
on e.g. the topic discussed and the sequential position of the question (e.g. 
Adelswärd et al. 1987, Archer 2005), the lexical framing devices employed (e.g. 
Gibbons 2003, Aldridge and Luchjenbroers 2007), the social and institutional 
relationship between questioner and respondent, the nature of the case 
and, ultimately, the wider legal cultural (Damaška 1997, Rosen 2008) and 
 (langua)cultural (Agar 1996, Risager 2005, Levisen 2012) context in which 
the trial takes place.
2.2. Comparative approaches to courtroom questioning
Many studies of courtroom questioning are concerned with how the uses of 
question types and questioning styles diff er in particular kinds of contexts 
and trial activities. For example, discussions oft en involve diff erences between 
the questioning styles employed in direct examination and cross-examination 
(Atkinson and Drew 1979, Danet and Bogoch 1980, Woodbury 1984, Archer 
2005, Gibbons 2008, Bednarek 2014, cf. section 2.3. below), or between 
courtroom questioning and other kinds of questioning or casual conversation 
(Atkinson and Drew 1979, Atkinson 1992, Gibbons 2003, Heritage and 
Clayman 2010). Diff erences relating to various categories of cases have also 
received attention, e.g. in Danet and Bogoch (1980) and Adelswärd et al. 
(1987), who investigate how questioning styles refl ect the seriousness of the 
accusation. Bednarek (2014), as one of the only studies, compares the use of 
question types in witness examinations across two diff erent legal systems and 
languages, i.e. the adversarial system of trial, represented by an American 
case, and the European inquisitorial system of trial, represented by a Polish 
case. No linguistic studies of Danish courtroom questioning exist, although 
questioning in a Danish courtroom context has been discussed from e.g. legal 
sociological, psychological and rhetorical perspectives (Smith 1986, Staff e 
2008, Beyer 2013). Other aspects of Danish courtroom interaction have been 
treated in Jacobsen (2002), Mortensen and Mortensen (2017) and Mortensen 
(2019), the latter comparing the use of interjections in American and Danish 
trial examinations, as refl ections of legal cultural diff erences. Th e present paper 
pursues this perspective further in another direction, comparing aspects of the 
questioning styles employed in American and Danish courtroom interaction.
2.3. Adversarial courtroom questioning in the United States and Denmark
Th e legal tradition followed in the United States and other English-speaking 
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countries is the common law tradition, where the adversarial system of trial is 
practiced, as opposed to the inquisitorial system of trial practiced in most of 
Continental Europe: 
Adversarial and inquisitorial procedures are structured around diff erent 
normative views of the trial. Under the adversarial ideal the law is a 
game, courts are where the contest takes place, and the goal of criminal 
procedure is to make sure the outcome is fair, even if the prosecution 
does not uncover the truth […] Under the inquisitorial ideal, the goal of 
the law is fact fi nding, and the criminal trial is a search for truth. (Kahn 
2004:13)
As discussed in Anderson (1992), Doak, Mcgourlay and Th omas (2018) 
and Mortensen (2019), the Danish legal system may be characterised as 
a hybrid between the two major systems, though adversarial in essence 
due to its structural organisation. Danish courtrooms adopt an adversarial 
participation structure similar to Anglo-Saxon trial settings. Th is involves, 
among other features, opposing advocates, i.e. prosecutors and defence 
lawyers actively representing their side of the case, and the recursive dialectic 
interplay between two modes of questioning known as direct examination or 
examination-in-chief (Danish: ‘afh øring’) and cross-examination (Danish: 
‘modafh øring’). Th e two modes of questioning are characterised as follows by 
Danet and Bogoch, based on the American courtroom context:
Direct examination is the rehearsed questioning by attorneys of their 
witnesses, while cross-examination is the unrehearsed questioning of 
the other side’s witnesses. Th e purpose of cross-examination is to test 
the credibility of the other side’s witnesses and, if possible, to destroy 
or reveal inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony presented during 
direct examination. (Danet and Bogoch 1980:37)5
American adversarial courtroom interaction is infamously harsh, formal and 
impersonal, especially during cross-examination, but even ‘friendly’ direct 
examination in the adversarial context is known to be formal and impersonal 
compared to most other kinds of conversation or interviewing.
Th e whole point of the exchange is to solicit a response that will inform 
the jury, who are watching and listening and will eventually pass 
judgment on the case. Th is state of aff airs is confi rmed and reinforced 
by the attorney’s practice of not responding to the answers with “oh”, or 
indeed with any kind of receipt object (yeah, uh huh, etc.). (Heritage and 
Clayman 2010:175) 
Th e Danish courtroom, on the other hand, while essentially adversarial, is 
characterised interactionally by an unaggressive, casual and even communal 
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approach to fact-fi nding, reminiscent of inquisitorial ideals (Kæraa 2011, 
Doak, McGourlay and Th omas 2018, Mortensen 2019), further enforced, it 
would appear, by more general languacultural traits of ‘Danishness’ (Fredsted 
2005, Levisen 2012). Mortensen (2019) illustrates how these diff erent legal 
traditions and languacultural norms manifest themselves linguistically in 
trial examinations through the ways in which Danish and American lawyers 
provide listener feedback in response to their witnesses’ testimony: 
… the Danish lawyer frames the defendant’s contributions as generally 
new and informative, although he – and the rest of the court – is likely 
to know most of the details in advance. In the American examination, 
on the other hand, the testimony is treated not so much as actual 
information being exchanged but […] rather as artefacts, as it were, i.e. 
pieces of a story being recited and put to display. (Mortensen 2019:168)
In the following sections, I present the data and method for examining how 
the two diff erent adversarial systems manage aspects of the questioning itself.
3. Data and method
3.1. American and Danish courtroom data
Th e data studied are gathered from one American criminal trial and three 
Danish criminal trials, refl ecting the fact that American courtroom questioning 
is already well-treated in the literature. Th us, the American data set may be 
seen as a control corpus to allow comparison with the more extensive Danish 
data set.
 Th e American criminal trial – also referred to as US1 – took place at the 
Seattle Municipal Court, Washington in 2016, and concerns harassment, i.e. a 
misdemeanour-level off ense. Th e offi  cial court transcript constitutes the data 
from this trial. It was kindly provided to me by Th e Defender Association in 
Seattle.
 Th e Danish criminal trials – individually referred to as DK1, DK2 and DK3 
– took place at the Court of Frederiksberg, Copenhagen in 2014 (DK1 and 
DK2) and 2018 (DK3). Th ey all concern physical assault and are comparable 
to the American trial in terms of severity of the potential punishment. DK1 
concerns the alleged assault on a parking offi  cer, DK2 concerns fi ghting 
between neighbours, DK3 concerns the alleged assault on a security offi  cer in a 
shopping mall. Audio recordings of the trials were automatically conducted by 
the court and, following the explicit consent of all individuals featured, kindly 
made available for linguistic research purposes.6 Th ese audio recordings, 
manually transcribed using CLAN transcription soft ware, constitute the 
Danish data.
 For both the American and the Danish data set, only witness examinations 
by prosecutors and defence lawyers have been included, meaning that all 
interactions between prosecutors, lawyers and judges, and between judges and 
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witnesses, have been left  out of the analysis. On this basis the total number of 
questions treated from the American data is 157, spread over 4,437 words 
spoken, while the larger Danish data set features 623 questions, spread over 
35,097 words in total. 
 Furthermore, both data sets have been subcategorised into direct 
examinations and cross-examinations, as this distinction is known to be a 
potential explanatory factor for some of the variation in courtroom questioning 
styles (cf. section 2.2. above). Th us, 95 of the 157 questions in the American 
trial were asked during direct examinations and 62 were asked during cross-
examinations. Correspondingly, the Danish data features 343 questions asked 
during direct examinations and 280 asked during cross-examinations (cf. 
appendix 4). 
3.2. Coding and analytical procedure
In order to systematically compare the questioning styles employed in the 
American and the Danish trials, I combine quantitative and qualitative 
analyses of the forms and functions of the questions occurring in the two 
data sets. For the quantitative analysis I employ a general question coding 
framework developed and discussed in sections 3.2.1., 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. 
below. Th e classifi cation features an adapted version of Archer’s model of 
morphosyntactic question types (cf. Figure 1 above) as well as a model of 
speech act functions applying to questions. In sections 4.1., 4.2. and 4.3., 
overall quantitative fi ndings are presented and discussed, comparing salient 
questioning patterns of the American and Danish data. Th e quantitative 
fi ndings have not been tested for signifi cance but are used heuristically to 
inspire the qualitative analysis and discussion of particular aspects of the data 
following in section 4.4. I generally refer to appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4 for complete 
quantitative overviews of the questions treated, including all classifi cations 
and cross-classifi cations of question types and speech act functions in direct 
and cross-examinations. Data from each of the three Danish trials, DK1, DK2 
and DK3, are presented in appendices 1, 2 and 3, respectively, while appendix 
4 presents the data from US1 juxtaposed with the aggregated data from DK1, 
DK2 and DK3. 
3.2.1. What counts as a question?
A fi rst step in the coding process was to mark up all questions occurring 
in the two data sets. I generally agree with Adelswärd et al.’s (1987) fairly 
encompassing notion of a ‘courtroom question’:
Note that in this analysis we use a comprehensive, contextual overall 
defi nition of ‘question’; in eff ect, all professionals’ turns (in the dialogue 
phases of trials) were interpreted as questions to the defendant, unless 
such an interpretation was virtually excluded. Deferring questions […] 
are, however, not included. (Adelswärd et al. 1987:338)
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However, treating questions simply as ‘turns’ in their entirety would not allow 
for manageable morphosyntactic classifi cation of the questions, seeing that a 
questioning turn may feature several prefatory statements (e.g. Clayman and 
Heritage 2002) introducing the ‘actual’ question, e.g.:
(8)  Prefatory statements preceding question, DK2
  DFL: øh [NAME] øh jeg vil godt lige spørge lidt lige for at få øh øh lidt  
 mere omkring baggrunden xxx det er også noget vi kommer   
 tilbage til xxx personlige forhold med med men øh: øh    
 hvor længe er det du har kendt øh [NAME]
   ‘uh [NAME] uh I’d just like to ask a bit to get uh uh a little   
 more regarding the background xxx it’s also something we’ll   
 return to xxx personal conditions with with but uh: uh how long  
 is it you’ve known uh [NAME]’ 
In order to single out the questions within the turns, I follow Archer’s (2005) 
general approach, based on Stenström (1988), among others, and take a 
number of features into account in what is essentially a hermeneutic process 
of delimiting “elicitation acts”:  
I will make use of the three levels that form the basis of [Stenström’s, 
ed.] approach when identifying my own questions. Th at is to say, (i) the 
lexical, grammatical and prosodic aspect (i.e. form), (ii) the speech act 
aspect (i.e. force), and (iii) the discoursal aspect (i.e. discourse structure) 
(Archer 2005:52)
Stenström (1988) defi nes an elicitation act broadly as “… an utterance that 
may elicit an R [i.e. a response, ed.]…”, covering “… not only requests for 
information but also requests for confi rmation and acknowledgment. My criteria 
for R function are placement and appropriateness…” (Stenström 1988:308). 
Adopting this functionally broad, yet structurally constrained, understanding 
of questions, I include – unlike Adelswärd et al. – “deferring questions”, i.e. 
“… repair questions asking for repetition, confi rmation or simple clarifi cation 
of something contained in the interlocutor’s preceding turn.” (Adelswärd et al. 
1987:328, repeated from the above quote), as these are indeed also elicitation 
functions. In fact, as will become clear, questions of this kind play an important 
role in explaining some of the central diff erences between the questioning 
styles observed in the data.
3.2.2. Morphosyntactic classifi cation
Each question occurring in the data was classifi ed in terms of morphosyntactic 
form as well as speech act function. Th e morphosyntactic coding scheme 
employed for both the American and the Danish data is adapted from 
Archer’s model (cf. Figure 1 above). While the model is explicitly developed 
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to account for questioning in English, it can be applied to Danish data as 
well, since the question types available in Danish are more or less equivalent, 
morphosyntactically, to those of English (see Heinemann 2010, Stivers 2010, 
Hjulmand and Schwarz 2017).7 While the classifi cation, as illustrated in the 
following sections, is rooted in formal properties of the questions, most of the 
categories involve some degree of semantic and contextual judgement as well.
Broad and narrow wh-questions
Although the Danish equivalent to wh-questions feature an hv-element 
instead of wh-, I use wh-questions as a general term for the English as well 
as the Danish occurrences. I moreover adopt the rough distinction between 
those asking broadly for e.g. descriptions, narratives, explanations, etc. – 
oft en introduced by e.g. how, why, what etc. (and Danish equivalents such as 
hvordan, hvorfor, hvad) – and those asking for specifi c pieces of information, 
oft en introduced by e.g. when, where, which, what (in Danish e.g., hvornår, 
hvor, hvilke, hvad). Note that what/hvad is mentioned in both categories to 
illustrate that the classifi cation of some wh-questions as broad or narrow does 
not rely on their form alone, but involves lexical and contextual interpretation, 
e.g.:
(9)  hvad-question classifi ed as broad, DK1
  PRC: øh men hvad er det der sker om eft ermiddagen den [DATE]   
 (0.5) hvor du er på job
   ‘uh but what is it that happens in the aft ernoon on [DATE] (0.5)  
 when you’re at work’
(10) hvad-question classifi ed as narrow, DK2
  PRC: og hvad hvad hedder de to naboer til fornavn
   ‘and what what are the fi rst names of the two neighbours’ 
Alternative questions
Alternative questions are questions through which the respondent is off ered a 
“choice of answers restricted to 1 of 2 provided by questioner” (Archer 2005:79, 
cf. Figure 1), e.g.:
(11) Alternative question, US1
  DFL: Is it like a SUV, or is it a truck?
  PRW: It’s an SUV.
Alternative questions consist of two (or more) yes/no-questions coordinated 
by disjunction, and do not licence a confi rmation or disconfi rmation but “… 
a response consisting of one of the alternatives mentioned in the question…” 
(Archer 2005:49, see also Sadock 2012:107). A similar kind of alternative may 
be off ered through declarative questions, e.g.:
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(12) Alternative declarative question, DK1
  PRC: ja jeg skal bare lige høre (.) parkeringsvagten tager fat (.) med sin  
 højre hånd (.) eller med sin venstre hånd
   ‘yes I’d just like to know (.) the parking offi  cer grabs hold (.) with  
 his right hand (.) or with his left  hand’
   (1.3) 
  DFW: det er hans højre hånd
   ‘it’s his right hand’
However, only the prototypical alternative question, featuring subject-verb 
inversion, is treated as a category in this study, while the marginal declarative 
variant is assigned to the ‘other/indeterminable’ category (described below).
Yes/no-questions
Rather than Archer’s term “grammatical yes/no-question” (which may lead 
to the misconception that some question types are not grammatical, or that 
this question type has a default status), I use the term ‘yes/no-question’ for 
inversion questions that license yes or no as default answers. I will not discuss 
this question type at length, but refer to example (4) above for illustration. 
 I will disregard Archers’ variant “negative grammatical yes/no-questions” 
(cf. example (5) above) as an individual category, as it is virtually non-existent 
in the data, and in principle hard to distinguish from regular yes/no-questions 
featuring e.g. “inner negation” (Buring and Gunlogson 2000) or “propositional 
negation” (Hansen and Heltoft  2011).  
Declarative questions
Like Archer, I distinguish between plain declarative questions and declarative 
questions with a fi nal tag, cf. examples (6) and (7) above. While a questioning 
tag usually marks a declarative sentence unmistakably as a question, untagged 
declarative questions do not have morphosyntactic features that clearly 
identify them as questions. Some studies (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985, Huddleston 
and Pullum 2002) assume or argue that declarative questions can be identifi ed 
prosodically, e.g.:
Th e declarative question is a type of question which is identical in form 
to a declarative, except for the fi nal rising question intonation. It is 
rather casual in tone:
You’ve got the explosive? ... (Quirk et al. 1985:814)
However, systematic investigations indicate that rising intonation is not a 
consistent feature of declarative questions and cannot be the sole criterion 
for identifying them (Geluykens 1988, Grønnum 2005, Heinemann 2010, 
Stivers 2010). In fact, according to Grønnum (2005), Danish declarative 
questions feature a fl at intonation contour, at the most, while other question 
Sune Sønderberg Mortensen
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (239-278)
251
types display various degrees of falling intonation. Th us, since there are no 
obvious formal features to distinguish declarative questions from other kinds 
of declaratives, my classifi cation is partly based on semantic and contextual 
interpretation, including the interactional behaviour of the respondents. As 
mentioned, I generally align with Adelswärd et al.’s notion that all contributions 
by prosecutors and lawyers can be understood as (parts of) questions, because 
questions are the only contributions allowed for them during examinations.
 Moreover, it should be noted that declarative clauses, like many other kinds 
of sentential and non-sentential expressions, can also occur in backchanneling 
functions that do not constitute turns nor elicit answers, but encourage the 
respondent to continue talking (Deng 2009:114); I do not interpret such 
occurrences as questions, and they are excluded from the analysis, e.g.:
(13) Declaratives not included as questions, DK3
  PRC: okay så bare sådan at vi lige får det sådan helt øh i skåret ud i   
 øh så der ikke er tvivl om hvad det er der sker øh ud fra fra dit  
 synspunkt så så det der sker det er at I I I er på rulletrappen på  
 vej op er det korrekt forstået
‘okay so you know just so we get it completely uh nailed down 
uh so there’s no doubt about what it is that happens uh from 
from your point of view so so what happens is that you you 
you’re on the escalator going up is that correctly understood’ 
  DEF: på hen på vej hen til rulletrappen
   ‘on to on our way to the escalator’
  PRC: I er på vej hen til rulletrappen
   ‘you’re on your way to the escalator’
  DEF: idet jeg stiller stolen fra mig lige det der jeg stiller den fra mig så 
   tager han fat i mig
   ‘as I put the chair down right there when I put it down then he  
 grabs hold of me’ 
  PRC: så tager han fat i dig
   ‘then he grabs hold of you’
  DEF: og jeg ser ingen grund til at han tager fat i mig fordi jeg har stillet 
   stolen fra mig og jeg er jo ikke på vej væk
   ‘and I don’t see any reason why he grabs hold of me because I’ve  
 put down the chair and I’m obviously not going away’ 
  PRC: okay
   ‘okay’
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On the other hand, declaratives that repeat the respondent’s statement may in 
other contexts function as questions, also known as echo questions, as they 
”… echo the stimulus, what has just been said, with a view to questioning some 
aspect of it …” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:855, cf. also Quirk et al. 1985, 
Noh 1998). Such echo questions are included as declarative questions and are 
recognised through the presence of an answer by the respondent, e.g.:
(14) Declarative as echo question, DK1
  DFW: fordi der sker hele tiden noget nyt derude
   ‘because there’s something new going on all the time out there’
   (1.2) 
  PRC: der sker hele tiden noget nyt derude
   ‘there’s something new going on all the time out there’ 
  DFW: hele tiden noget nyt derude ja
   ‘something new all the time yes’ 
  PRC: ja
   ‘yes’ 
Tag questions
A questioning tag following a declarative clause marks the clause as a tag 
question. Tags may vary in form between single words, fragments and full 
clauses, e.g.:
(15) Tag question, single-word tag, DK1
  DFL: det er den dag ikke
   ‘it’s that day right’
(16) Tag question, fragment tag, DK3
  DFL: og du kommer altså ned ad en rulletrappe eller hvad
   ‘and so you’re heading down an escalator or what’
  PRW: øh øh rullebånd ja f- ja
   ‘um um travelator yes f- yes’
(17) Tag question, full-clause tag, DK3
  DFL: okay som jeg forstår dig så er det sådan at at han er ikke alene  
 om at få dig ned på jorden er det rigtigt
   ‘okay the way I understand you it is so that that he’s not alone in  
 getting you down to the ground is that right’
Especially in the case of full clauses, determining whether they are to be 
treated as tags or as separate utterances is an assessment hinging on semantic 
and contextual interpretation. While prosody would appear to be a relevant 
criterion, the fact that the American data merely consist of a court transcript, 
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void of prosodic evidence, rules out such an approach. Punctuation and 
orthography do appear to represent, to some extent, the transcriber’s 
interpretations regarding potential tags, as the choices vary, even within single 
turns and sequences, e.g.:
(18) Transcription of potential tag questions, US1
  PRC: So, there were, by my count, four people in this car, correct?   
 You, [NAME], your sister and your daughter. Correct?
(19) Transcription of potential tag questions, US1
  PRC: Okay. And, that you knew that the defendant and your son’s   
 current girlfriend have two children, right?
  PRW: Yes.
  PRC: Okay. And, your son’s current girlfriend is [NAME]. Is that   
 correct?
  PRW: Yes.
  PRC: And, on [DATE] 2015 when this incident occurred, you were   
 aware that your son and the defendant didn’t have a particularly  
 good relationship, correct?
Ultimately, however, my classifi cation does not rely on these transcription 
features as decisive criteria, as it is impossible to know whether this kind of 
variation is due to conscious interpretation or inconsistency. Th us, I have 
classifi ed all of the highlighted questioning elements in examples (18) and 
(19) above as tags attached to the preceding sentences, even though “Correct?” 
and “Is that correct?” are both represented by the transcriber as if they were 
separate utterances. Th is classifi cation is based on the observation that the 
questioning elements refer indisputably to the accuracy of their preceding 
statements and, thereby, eff ectively override their assertive potential despite 
possible prosodic pauses before the tags.
Other/indeterminable 
Th e fi nal morphosyntactic category contains a range of constructions that 
are for various reasons not covered by the previous categories. Th ey include 
elliptical, embedded, combined and otherwise syntactically ambiguous 
questions, as well as imperative constructions, e.g.:
(20) Elliptical question, DK1
  DFL: er det en der fast passer (0.2) det område der
   ‘is he someone who regularly manages (0.2) that area’
  DFW: det var han ja
   ‘he was yes’
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  DFL: det var han
   ‘he was’
  DFW: ja
   ‘yes’ 
  DFL: dagligt (0.3) ligefrem
   ‘on a daily basis (0.3) even’
  DFW: han var der meget tit han var der fl ere gange om dagen
   ‘he was there very oft en he was there several times a day’ 
(21) Embedded question, DK1
  DFL: kan du: er du så tæt på at du kan høre om (0.1) der (0.6) udveksles 
   bemærkninger ord mellem de to
   ‘can you: are you close enough to hear (0.1) whether (0.6)   
 comments words are exchanged between the two’
 (22) Combination of syntactic forms interpreted as one question8, DK1
  DFL: hvorfor siger han det siger han det ind i en telefon
   ‘why is he saying it is he saying it into a phone’
 (23) Imperative9, US1
  DFL: Go ahead and talk about what happened, just don’t say   
 anything about what [NAME] said.
3.2.3. Speech act classifi cation
While questions are in many speech act frameworks, including Searle’s 
own (e.g. Searle 1976), treated as a special kind of directive speech act, this 
classifi cation has been shown to be simplistic and even inaccurate (see e.g. 
Levinson 1983:275, Archer 2005:41ff , Borchmann 2020, this issue, Nielsen 
2020, this issue, for discussions). Instead, as suggested in Mortensen (2018), 
I consider questioning not as a particular kind of speech act but rather as a 
partly grammaticalised interactional mode through which a range of speech 
act functions may be realised (see related discussion in Heim and Wiltschko 
2020, this issue). Th is understanding of questions builds on the adaptation of 
Habermas’ (1984) speech act theory proposed in Hansen and Heltoft  (2011):
Corresponding to the four speech act dimensions, four basic speech 
act types can be distinguished: communicatives, constatives, 
representatives and regulatives. Th ey pair with each other in a way 
that will be elaborated below.
understanding truth truthfulness  appropriateness
communicatives constatives representatives regulatives
(Hansen and Heltoft  2011:53, my translation)
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Some of the speech act types correspond roughly to Searle’s speech act categories, 
in that constatives canonically correspond to assertives, representatives 
(roughly) to expressives, and regulatives comprise directives and commissives, 
thus dealing with obligations and permissions applying to hearer or speaker 
(Hansen and Heltoft  2011:64). Yet, Hansen and Heltoft  diverge from Searle as 
they treat truth-oriented questions as constative speech acts, since they can 
be said to express uncertainty about the truth of a proposition (Hansen and 
Heltoft  2011:56, a view in line with e.g. Lyons 1977, Schrott 2000). Moreover, the 
category of communicatives has no apparent equivalent in Searle’s taxonomy; 
communicative speech acts are metacommunicative acts that help the speaker 
and hearer to reach understanding, concerning e.g. the correct expression and 
perception of the linguistic code, the meaning of words or utterances, or the 
relevant inferences to be drawn (Hansen and Heltoft  2011:54ff ).
 On this basis, the questions in the data were classifi ed according to their 
speech act functions, employing the categories constative questions, regulative 
questions, communicative questions and other/indeterminable speech act 
functions, to be illustrated below. Representative questions were not included 
as a category, as no apparent examples were found in the data, unsurprisingly. 
While judgments, evaluations and accusations may be implicitly conveyed 
through courtroom questioning (Atkinson and Drew 1979, Bülow-Moller 
1992, Komter 1994, Heritage and Clayman 2010), overt expressions of personal 
opinions and feelings do not count as allowable contributions.
Constative questions
Constative questions are elicitations concerning the truth of a proposition 
– expressed by e.g. yes/no-questions or tag questions – or elicitations of a 
particular piece of information that renders a proposition true – expressed by 
e.g. wh-questions:
(24) Constative yes/no-question, US1
  PRC: And, Ms. [NAME], are you currently married?
(25) Constative tag question, US1
  PRC: But, he was leaning out of the truck, correct?
(26) Constative wh-question, US1
  PRC: And, Ms. [NAME], what do you do for a living? 
Regulative questions
Regulative questions are questions that impose an obligation or permission on 
the respondent (or the questioner) to carry out some action, for example to 
talk. While they may in principle involve ordering – e.g. Answer the question! – 
they are typically requests of various kinds, expressed by e.g. yes/no-questions 
– also known as ‘requestions’ (Danet and Kermish 1978) – or declaratives or 
imperatives, e.g.:
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(27) Regulative yes/no-question, US1
  PRC: Would you please introduce yourself to the jury and spell your  
   last name for the record?
(28) Regulative declarative question, US1
  DFL: So, if you don’t remember, I could provide this to you, and you  
   can have a look at it
(29) Regulative imperative question, US1
  PRC:  Mr. [NAME], please state your name and spell your last name  
   for the jury
Communicative questions
Communicative questions are metacommunicative elicitation acts related to the 
understanding or clarifi cation of other utterances, or possible inferences from 
other utterances. Th e object utterances addressed in such metacommunicative 
questions may have been produced either by the questioner – in which case 
I refer to the questions as self-clarifi cations – or by the respondent – in which 
case I refer to them as other-clarifi cations. Th ey may be expressed through 
(partial) repetition, including echo questions (cf. 3.2.2), or other question 
types, with or without lexical items specifying the clarifying function: 
(30) Communicative question, other-clarifi cation, DK3
  DEF: det kan jeg ikke det det det kan jeg ikke
   ‘I can’t I I I can’t’
  DFL: det kan du ikke huske
   ‘you don’t remember’
  DEF: overhovedet ikke
   ‘not at all’
(31) Communicative questions, other-clarifi cation followed by self-  
 clarifi cation, DK3
  PRC: okay øh jeg skulle jeg forstå det sådan at den første spytklat   
   rammer dig
   ‘okay uh I should I understand it so that the fi rst spit hits you’
  PRW: hvad for noget
   ‘what’
  PRC: skulle jeg forstå det således at den første spytklat rammer dig
   ‘should I understand it so that the fi rst spit hits you’
Communicative questions as a category may be said to comprise both what 
is known in the conversation analytical tradition as repair activities (Sacks, 
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Schegloff  and Jeff erson 1977, Dingemanse, Blythe and Dirksmeyer 2014) and 
formulations (Heritage and Watson 1979, Van der Houwen and Sliedrecht 
2016, see also section 4.4.). Hence, simple clarifi cation may or may not be 
the questioner’s actual or main purpose of communicative questions, as they 
can also be used to highlight, summarise, dispute or evaluate their object 
utterances for various purposes. Still, clarifi cation is taken here to be their 
shared default function, even if only ostensive or staged. 
 Since communicative questions may be given a regulative speech act frame, 
double classifi cation is possible for this particular speech act combination, 
e.g.:
(32) Communicative + regulative question10, DK3
  DFL: ja og det han siger til dig øh hvad er det
   ‘yes and what he says to you uh what is that’
  PRW: det har jeg jo lige sagt derovre
   ‘I just told you over there’
  DFL: ja men prøv lige prøv lige at gentage det
   ‘yes but just try just try and repeat it’
Other/indeterminable
In some cases, assessing whether a question is to be classifi ed as constative or 
communicative is fairly straightforward, as lexical, grammatical or sequential 
features narrow down the possible interpretations, whereas other questions 
are hard to classify, e.g.:
(33) Question with clearly communicative speech act function, DK2  
  PRC: og du siger at at at at tiltalte [NAME] han øh han han står   
   ligesom (0.8) over dig og har fat i dig
 ‘and you say that that that that the defendant [NAME] he’s um  
 he’s he’s like (0.8) standing over you and holding on to you’
(34) Question with other/indeterminable speech act function, DK2
  PRC: og så falder [NAME] ligesom ned på jorden
   ‘and then [NAME] sort of falls down on the ground’
  DEF: ja og da der er de andre kommet
   ‘yes and at that time the others have arrived’
  PRC: og så kommer der nogle naboer til
   ‘and then some neighbours arrive’
  DEF: ja (0.9)
   ‘yes’ 
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PRC: øhm: (1.0) vil det sige at at han bliver liggende da du bliver 
overfaldet af de andre
 ‘uhm: (1.0) does this mean that that he remains on the ground 
when you’re being attacked by the others’
  DEF: ja (0.6)
   ‘yes’
Examples (33) and (34) both feature metacommunicative verbs, but only the 
question in (33) is classifi ed as a communicative question, as it clearly addresses 
– and asks for clarifi cation of – the meaning of some previous utterance. 
In (34), vil det sige ‘does this mean’ may refer either to the meaning of the 
defendant’s utterances or to the logical implications of the unfolding events. 
Only in the former reading would the question qualify as communicative, and 
for this reason the question is classifi ed as ‘other/indeterminable’.
4. Analysis and discussion
Based on the general coding of questions occurring in the data, and the 
specifi c classifi cation of the questions into subtypes in terms of morphosyntax 
and speech act functions, I now go on to present and discuss some of the 
overall fi ndings in sections 4.1., 4.2. and 4.3. below. Th ese fi ndings lead to a 
more specifi c discussion of declarative questions and their uses, following in 
section 4.4.
4.1. Question-talk ratio
As mentioned in section 3., the American data feature 157 questions out of 
a total of 4,437 words (cf. Table 1 below), which corresponds approximately 
to one question for every 28 words spoken. In the Danish data 623 questions 
occur out of 35,097 words spoken, corresponding approximately to one 
question for every 56 words. Th us, from an overall perspective, the Danish 
trials appear to be twice as ‘talkative’ as the American trial, in relation to 
the purpose of eliciting evidence, which seems to refl ect in a very basic way 
the characterisation of Danish courtroom interaction as quite informal (cf. 
section 2.3.). 
Table 1: Question-talk ratios in the American and the Danish data
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Words spoken Questions asked Words per question
American data 4,437 157 28.3
Counsel11 2,453 (55.3%) 15.6
Witnesses 1,984 (44.7%) 12.6
Danish data 35,097 623 56.3
Counsel 15,131 (43.1%) 24.3
Witnesses 19,966 (56.9%) 32.0
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Table 1 moreover shows that both counsel and witnesses contribute to the 
higher amount of talk per question in the Danish data. However, the most 
salient diff erence is found in the contributions by witnesses, as the Danish 
witnesses speak close to three times as many words for each question (32.0) 
as the American witnesses (12.6). More generally, witnesses dominate the 
‘interactional fl oor’ in the Danish examinations (56.9%), unlike the American 
examinations, where counsel speak the most (55.3%). Th ese diff erences in 
response behaviour and distribution of talk are refl ections of how the lawyers 
and prosecutors approach their questioning, and of the kinds of constraints 
their questioning imposes on the witnesses. In the following sections, I discuss 
the types and functions of questions occurring in the two data sets.
4.2. Distribution of morphosyntactic question types
For both data sets, the number of occurrences of each of the morphosyntactic 
question types was calculated as percentages of the total number of questions 
in the data. Th us, Figure 2 below represents the relative distribution of 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of morphosyntactic question types in the two data 
sets
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A striking diff erence between the American and the Danish data is the much 
higher frequency of declarative questions used in the Danish examinations. 
Moreover, the ‘other/indeterminable’ category is more extensively represented 
in the Danish data than in the American data (as briefl y discussed in section 
4.4. below). Apart from these observations, the question type distributions 
seem fairly similar across the two data sets.
 However, a more complex pattern emerges when we draw a distinction 
between question types used during direct and cross-examinations, as 
illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
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Other/indeterminable
Figure 3: Frequency distributions of question types in direct and cross-
examinations
Firstly, no declarative questions are used during direct examinations in the 
American trial, as opposed to the Danish trials, where declarative questions 
abound in both modes of examination. Secondly, the American direct 
examinations are dominated by yes/no-questions and wh-questions, while the 
cross-examinations, in addition to the extensive use of declarative questions 
and yes/no-questions, feature signifi cantly more tag questions, but no broad 
wh-questions. Th ese distributional facts are not surprising, as they refl ect 
well-known interactional diff erences recognised in studies of Anglo-Saxon 
direct and cross-examination, e.g.:
Th e rules of evidence which apply to the diff erent types of examination 
(examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination) clearly 
have implications for the kinds of questions which may be asked, and for 
the distribution of certain sequences: for example, the rules applying to 
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examination-in-chief not only aff ect the format in which questions may 
be put, but also result in the infrequency of sequences in which counsel 
challenge witnesses’ evidence. (Atkinson and Drew 1979:35)
Indeed, a higher frequency of question types from the most controlling end of 
the continuum, i.e. tag questions and declarative questions, as well as a lower 
frequency of the least controlling question type, i.e. broad wh-questions, are 
expected in cross-examination, where witnesses (including defendants) will 
likely attempt to resist the questioner’s agenda and to (re)assert their story:
In the adversarial Anglo-American criminal-judicial system, cross-
examination is essentially hostile. Attorneys test the veracity or 
credibility of the evidence being given by witnesses with questions 
which are designed to discredit the other side’s version of events, and 
instead to support his or her own side’s case. (Drew 1992:470)
Th e Danish examinations, on the other hand, clearly stand out from the typical 
Anglo-Saxon adversarial picture, given the extensive similarity between the 
questioning styles adopted during the direct and the cross-examinations. Th is 
similarity to some degree echoes a characterisation of Swedish courtroom 
interaction off ered by Adelswärd et al. (1987):
Th e whole procedure is less accusatorial than in the Anglo-Saxon 
system, and the diff erence between examination and cross-examination, 
e.g. concerning types of questions, is not very salient, at least not in petty 
off ence trials. (Adelswärd et al. 1987:316)
However, while the data concur in showing similarity between the Danish 
direct and cross-examinations, they do not clearly indicate that the Danish 
trials are “less accusatorial” than the American trial. In fact, the Danish and 
the American cross-examinations seem fairly alike in terms of controlling 
question types, with the exception of tag questions, as yes/no-questions and 
declarative questions are highly frequent in both.
 Th e high frequency of declarative questions across the Danish data 
is surprising, both in light of their total absence from the American direct 
examinations,11 and in light of the relaxed and non-confrontational 
interactional style typically associated with Danish trial examinations. We can 
elaborate on these distributional facts by considering the speech act functions 
realised in the two data sets.
4.3. Distribution of speech act functions
When juxtaposing the speech act functions in the American and the Danish 
data, still distinguishing between direct and cross-examinations, we get a 
pattern as illustrated in Figure 4 below:
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Speech act func  ons in direct and cross-examina  ons 
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Figure 4: Frequency distributions of speech act functions in direct and cross-
examinations13
Figure 4 generally shows that the Danish lawyers and prosecutors employ 
metacommunication more extensively than their American colleagues, 
especially when comparing direct examinations. It should be noted that the 
communicative questions are mainly other-clarifi cations across the data, 
while this is more salient in the Danish data (91%), compared to the American 
data (63%), cf. Appendix 4. Other-clarifi cations are nearly absent from the 
American direct examinations.14 In other words, Danish counsel spend 
signifi cantly more questions on clarifying (for various potential purposes, cf. 
section 3.2.3.) what their witnesses say, mean or (might be taken to) imply 
than American counsel. Constative questions are the most frequent speech act 
type across the data, but while they massively dominate the American direct 
examinations, their frequencies are signifi cantly lower in the remaining data, 
where communicative questions take over to various degrees.    
 When cross-analysing speech act functions and morphosyntactic question 
types, we fi nd that communicative questions, across the data, are primarily 
realised by declarative questions (59%), allegedly one of the most controlling 
question types. In order to understand and explain this correlation, I now 
focus the discussion on declarative questions, to illustrate how this controlling 
question type contributes to communicative and other speech act functions in 
the witness examinations.
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4.4. Th e uses of declarative questions
Declarative questions, whether discussed separately from or together with 
tag questions, are located at the far most controlling end of most question 
type clines (e.g. those of Danet and Bogoch 1980, Harris 1984, Woodbury 
1984, Gibbons 2003, Archer 2005). Since they “… assert more than they ask…” 
(Danet and Bogoch 1980, cf. section 2.1.), declarative questions, like tag 
questions, can be of great value to prosecutors and defence lawyers in their 
attempt to “… supply a particular prepared account of events to the judge (and 
jury).” (Gibbons 2003:96). For this reason, most studies fi nd that declarative 
questions, tagged and untagged, are best suited for, and occur most frequently 
in, cross-examination rather than direct examination (e.g. Danet and Bogoch 
1980, Harris 1984, Woodbury 1984, Gibbons 2008, Seuren 2019). However, 
Adelswärd et al. (1987), based on Swedish data, give a diff erent characterisation 
of declarative questions (referring to them, tagged and untagged, as Q-DECL):
Danet and Bogoch […] and Woodbury […] have both argued that […] 
Q-DECL is the most constraining type. Unlike these authors, we would 
argue that the status of the declarative question is actually ambiguous. 
While a Q-DECL may communicate that the questioner assumes the 
proposition expressed in the question to be true and that, therefore, 
the question can be responded to in a minimal manner (simple 
confi rmation), it can also be interpreted as a rather conversation-like 
way of inviting more substantial responses from one’s interlocutor. 
(Adelswärd et al. 1987:339)
Part of the reason for the “ambiguous” status of declarative questions is hinted 
at by Woodbury, who observes that untagged declarative questions tend to 
address given information (Woodbury 1984:222), i.e. they are used, as Seuren 
(2019) has it, “… to request confi rmation on information that is already in 
evidence.” (Seuren 2019:355). Similarly, Mortensen (2018), from a functional 
grammatical perspective, argues that untagged, unmodifi ed declarative 
questions in Danish – but not in English – are inherently metacommunicative, 
i.e. they express communicative speech act functions (cf. section 3.2.2.). Th is 
is illustrated in example (35), where the prosecutor fi rst asks the defendant for 
new information (i.e. a constative question), using a narrow wh-question, then 
restates the defendant’s testimony for clarifi cation, by means of a declarative 
question:
(35) Declarative question expressing (other-clarifying) communicative 
speech act, DK2
  PRC: og hvor øh:: (0.3) hvis det var det var lykkedes [NAME] at at   
 ramme dig med den der hånd (0.5) hvor havde han ramt dig   
 henne
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  ‘and where uh:: (0.3) if [NAME] had succeeded in striking you 
with that hand (0.5) where would he had struck you’
  DEF: så ville han have ramt mig her på brystet
   ‘then he would have struck me here in my chest’
  PRC: okay så det er et skub mod brystet vi taler om han forsøgte på
   ‘okay so it’s a push to the chest we’re talking about him trying to  
   do’ 
  DEF: ja ja ja
   ‘yes yes yes’
In the excerpt, the word skub ‘push’ – a fairly mild representation of a physical 
aggression against the defendant – appears to be introduced by the prosecutor, 
perhaps to undermine the defendant’s ‘self-defence’ narrative, but it has in 
fact been introduced by the defendant himself in earlier statements. Th us, the 
prosecutor’s summary of the defendant’s testimony is accurate, but the excerpt 
illustrates that declarative questions can be used for both manipulative and 
more neutral metacommunicative purposes, depending on the context. 
Seuren (2019), focusing on direct examinations, describes a prototypical use 
of declarative questions as follows:
… the prosecutor designs his question as an upshot of the witness’ 
answer by (a) repeating part of that answer, (b) articulating that these 
were her words, (c) asking his question using declarative word order and 
(d) prefacing it with so […] Th e prosecutor goes to great lengths to show 
that he is asking the witness to confi rm something she said; these are not 
his words. (Seuren 2019:346)
As mentioned, in the present case study, no declarative questions are featured 
in the American direct examinations, but Seuren’s description help us 
understand how declarative questions are oft en used in the Danish direct 
examinations, e.g.:
(36) Declarative question in direct examination, DK3
  PRC:  okay øhm er det din opfattelse at at at det var et øh bevidst   
   øh valg at spytte [NAME] i hovedet
‘okay uhm is it your belief that that that it was a uh deliberate  
uh choice to spit [NAME] in his head’
  PRW: helt klart helt klart meget provokerende han råbte og skreg og   
   trusler og spyttede så det det var fordi han var aggressiv og ja
   ‘defi nitely defi nitely very provocative he was yelling and   
   screaming and threats and spitting so it was because he was   
   aggressive and yes’
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  PRC: godt så han havde en aggr- aggressiv fremtoning
    ‘right so he had an aggr- aggressive appearance’
  PRW: ja det havde han
    ‘yes he did’
Th us, in the Danish direct examinations declarative questions typically realise 
fairly neutral and supportive communicative speech acts, as their main 
purposes are clarifi cation, emphasis and elaboration.
 In cross-examinations, on the other hand, declarative questions may 
be used for more manipulative purposes that are not in the interest of the 
witnesses or the side they represent. Adelswärd et al. (1987) discuss this 
feature, associating declarative questions with the notion of (re)formulations 
coined by Heritage and Watson (1979): 
What a dominant party characteristically does in a reformulation is to 
summarize aspects of what the interlocutor has just said, reformulate 
it in other words, draw conclusions from it and very oft en assign an 
interpretation that has not been expressed by the interlocutor himself. 
[…] In the trials, they are oft en given the form of declarative questions. 
(Adelswärd et al. 1987:323)
Th e Danish cross-examinations feature several examples of this, e.g.:
(37) Declarative questions in cross-examination, DK1
DFL:   [reading aloud from police report quoting the witness]
 (1.0) har du forklaret sådan
   ‘(1.0) have you said this’
  PRW:  det tror jeg ikke jeg har forklaret
    ‘I don’t believe I’ve said that’
    (1.0) 
  DFL:  det tror du ikke på
    ‘you don’t believe in that’
PRW:   nej (0.3) jeg har formentlig forklaret (0.6) at jeg...
 ‘no I’ve probably said (0.6) that I...’ 
 [witness’ alternative wording]
 (0.7) 
  DFL:  så det jeg kan udlede det er politimanden der må have skrevet  
    forkert
    ‘so what I can deduce it is the policeman who must have   
    written wrong’
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  PRW:  øh det må være min opfattelse (0.7) som jeg husker det nu
    ’uh that must be my perception (0.7) as I recall it now’
  DFL:  okay
    ‘okay’
In this excerpt, the witness dissociates himself from statements attributed to 
him by the police. When repeating the witness’ negative response, the lawyer 
adds the preposition på ‘in’, and thereby misrepresents the stance taken by 
the witness, changing it from moderate (negative) assessment into stubborn 
disbelief. Th e witness, apparently not alert to this subtle reformulation, 
confi rms without hesitation and off ers his own alternative account of what 
he said to the police. Th is prompts the lawyer to make another reformulation, 
accentuating the implication that the police offi  cer in that case must be wrong. 
Th is implication is attributed to the witness, even though the lawyer is the one 
drawing it – “these are not his words”, as Seuren has it (cf. the above quote). 
Th e reformulation moreover includes the slightly infantile and condescending 
lexemes politimanden ‘the policeman’ (rather than e.g. politibetjenten ‘the 
police offi  cer’) and skrevet forkert ‘written wrong’, thereby ridiculing the 
witness. Th e witness once again confi rms the reformulation, assumingly 
without realising that he has now accepted being framed – ostensibly by his 
own words – as stubborn, irrational and infantile/simple-minded as well as 
disrespectful towards the police.
 In each of the three examples above, the declarative questions – as 
morphosyntactic question types – convey the same core meaning, i.e. the 
request for confi rmation of a particular understanding of something the 
respondent, allegedly, said before. Like most declarative questions they 
constitute communicative questions, as they elicit clarifi cation, or at least 
pretend to. Th ey illustrate how pragmatically versatile declarative questions 
are, which explains their omnipresence in the Danish witness examinations, 
both direct and cross-examinations.
 Th e puzzling question is, then, why are they not seen as a valuable 
communicative resource in the American direct examinations? Since 
no examples are off ered in the data, we can turn to the American cross-
examinations instead, where declarative questions are amply represented, e.g.:
(38) Declarative questions in American cross-examination, US1
  DFL:  Did you tell them to get away from your property?
  PRW:  I did.
  DFL:  Did they get away from your property?
  PRW:  Aft er shouting the threats at me.
  DFL:  And, did you walk towards the vehicle?
PRW:   I walked towards the trunk of my car once -- yeah, I did walk  
 towards the trunk of my car.
Sune Sønderberg Mortensen
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (239-278)
267
  DFL:  Did you walk towards the Yukon?
  PRW:  No.
  DFL:  Did you ever walk towards the Yukon?
PRW:   You know what? I would have to be walking towards the   
 Yukon  to go to my trunk.
  DFL:  Okay. So, you did walk towards the Yukon?
    [...]
  DFL:  And, to your knowledge [NAME] never set foot on your   
    property?
  PRW:  No. He remained in the -- in the truck.
  DFL:  And, to your knowledge, he had no weapons with him?
  PRW:  None that I saw.
  DFL:  And also, there’s a gun in your household.
  PRC:  Objection, Your Honor, relevance.  
In this excerpt, the witness is questioned about core events of the case, i.e. the 
defendant harassing and threatening her on her property. Th e defence lawyer 
draws attention to the fact that the defendant eventually left  without hurting 
anyone, and tries to develop and sustain a narrative where the witness was 
never in real danger. He does this by construing her as powerful and agentive. 
When she fi nally admits to have walked in the direction of the defendant’s 
car (‘the Yukon’) – rather than e.g. backing away from the danger – the 
defence lawyer uses a declarative question to (partially) repeat and thereby 
highlight her statement, as much as highlight the fact that she just changed 
her testimony, a point accentuated though the contrastive use of did (cf. 
Raymond 2017). Th is is a communicative question, as it clearly addresses her 
previous statement, to secure that the jury understands, takes due notice 
and draws the right inferences. Th e three ensuing declarative questions are, 
on the other hand, constative questions, as they do not signal any relation 
to previous utterances. Rather they present assumptions or knowledge, e.g. 
based on background investigation, which the lawyer will not allow the 
witness an opportunity to challenge. As discussed in Mortensen (2018), such 
constative use of (untagged, unmodifi ed) declarative questions is hard, if not 
impossible, to realise in Danish, but appears to be a semantic possibility 
in English (like in other European languages, with French as a canonical 
example). Th is diff erent meaning potential may be part of the reason why 
declarative questions come across as highly controlling and confrontational 
in the Anglo-Saxon courtroom context, and hence not immediately suitable 
for direct examinations. In the Danish courtroom context, even though 
declarative questions have the potential to be used for manipulative and 
perhaps coercive purposes like in (37), classifying them as highly controlling 
questions on a scale does not adequately capture what they do interactionally. 
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Th ey are indeed hard to resist – but this is not primarily due to the discursive 
constraints imposed by their morphosyntax on the answer type, like in 
the case of e.g. tag questions and yes/no-questions. Indeed, depending on 
the context it can be fairly unproblematic to answer a declarative question 
with elaboration or clarifi cation rather than yes/no, while answering a tag 
question without explicitly confi rming or disconfi rming appears discursively 
incongruous, as illustrated in (39) below:
(39) Declarative question and answer, followed by tag question and   
  answer, DK2
PRC:   jeg skal først og fremmest (0.7) høre (0.3) om: øh: du kender  
 tiltalte i forvejen
   ‘I fi rstly (0.7) want to hear (0.3) if: uh: you know the    
 defendant beforehand’
 (1.0)
  DFW:  hvem er tiltalte
    ‘who is the defendant’ 
    [Assumingly defendant is visually pointed out in court] 
  DFW:  nå (.) nej jeg kender ham ikke
    ‘oh (.) no I don’t know him’ 
 (0.5) 
  PRC:  du kender ham ikke
    ‘you don’t know him’
DFW:   han har været inde og reparere hans bil en gang jeg tror   
 nok det er e- en eller to gange (0.2) fået lavet service på den   
 men det er ikke (0.5) for nyligt
   ‘he’s been in to fi x his car once I think it’s once or twice (0.2)  
 had service done on it but it’s not (0.5) recently’ 
 (0.3) 
PRC:   men du ku- (0.2) men så kender du ham jo også lidt kan man  
 sige ikke (.) det er en kunde
   ‘but you cou- (0.2) but then you do know him a bit one might  
 say right (.) he’s a customer’
 (0.2) 
  DFW:  jeg ka- jeg ka- ved ikke engang hvad han hedder
    ‘I ca- I ca- don’t even know his name’ 
 (0.8) 
  PRC:  nej (0.7) men det er en (.) som har været kunde ved dig
    ‘no (0.7) but it’s someone (.) who has been a customer of yours’
  DFW:  ja
    ‘yes’
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Th e defence witness, an auto mechanic, attempts to counter the prosecutor’s 
notion that he knows the defendant beforehand, and the implied accusation 
that he might therefore be biased in the defendant’s favour. Aft er simply 
disconfi rming the prosecutor’s initial question, the witness answers her 
follow-up declarative question by explaining his relation to the defendant. 
While his explanation may certainly be questionable, it is not inappropriate as 
an answer to the question, as it clearly responds to the prosecutor’s incredulity 
(see related discussion of echo questions expressing incredulity in Archer 
2020, this issue). His response to the ensuing tag question, on the other hand, 
attacks the argument rather than answering the question, succumbing, as it 
were, to the tag question’s constraining force.
 Th e exchange illustrates that both declarative questions and tag questions 
are powerful resources for steering the interaction in particular directions – 
but that they diff er not only in degrees of control but also in the manner of 
control. What appears to be declarative questions’ secret weapon is that they, 
for particular strategic uses, off er the ability to lure untrained or off -guard 
witnesses into confi rming, by disguising whatever new and controversial 
information they may carry. As declarative questions invariably convey the 
sense of addressing information already in evidence, they invite respondents, 
rather than force them, to treat everything contained in the question as 
something the respondent already said or implied anyway. In this respect, to 
briefl y regress to the discussion in section 2.1. above, their coercive potential 
may be a more signifi cant trait than their controlling force, at least in Danish.
 Another, and possibly stronger, reason for the diff erent status of declarative 
questions in American and Danish witness examinations is rooted more deeply 
in the legal cultures of the two countries. As discussed, the American adversarial 
courtroom culture entails, according to some commentators, treating law as 
a kind of game, where truth is a question of the most convincing narrative. 
Direct examinations are meticulously planned and rehearsed to win the 
audience (i.e. the jury), and the witnesses’ testimony is therefore rarely treated 
by counsel as new information in the ways new information is managed in 
everyday conversation. In a context like this, repeatedly asking for clarifi cation 
– by means of e.g. declarative questions – is unnecessary, at best, and might 
even come across as a sign of poor preparation or insecurity concerning the 
legitimacy or quality of the testimony. Th e Danish legal culture, on the other 
hand, infl uenced by the inquisitorial ideals of a sincere and communal search 
for the truth, perhaps combined with what has been described as highly 
egalitarian values and “strong cultural aversion towards violence and aggressive 
behaviour” (see discussion in Levisen 2012:3), is more inclined towards an 
informal, conversation- or interview-like questioning style. Th is diff erence in 
formality even seems manifest in the ‘other/indeterminable’ question category, 
where syntactically ambiguous questions are twice as common in the Danish 
trials as in the more composed American trial (cf. appendix 4 and section 
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4.4.). In this fairly loose interactional environment, metacommunication of 
all kinds, including asking for clarifi cation, is embraced as natural, even if the 
underlying goals of the metacommunication, and the communication as such, 
are oft en strategic and manipulative rather than idealistic.
5. Conclusion
I have compared all the witness examinations in one American and three 
Danish criminal trials, by means of quantitative as well as qualitative 
analyses. Th e quantitative analyses are based on an extensive coding scheme, 
introduced, developed and discussed in relation to the actual data treated. 
Th e coding scheme features the major morphosyntactic question types as 
well as the overall speech act functions potentially realised by a question. Th e 
most striking result of the quantitative analysis is the fact that the Danish 
defence lawyers and prosecutors use declarative questions signifi cantly more 
than their American colleagues, especially when direct examinations are 
compared. In stark contrast to the Danish direct examinations, which abound 
with declarative questions, the American direct examinations feature no 
occurrences of declarative questions at all; and although their complete absence 
may constitute an extreme case, the marked diff erence between the American 
and Danish direct examinations clearly calls for linguistic, legal and cultural 
explanations. Th e diff erence correlates to some extent with the distribution 
of speech act functions, as the study moreover fi nds that communicative 
speech acts are prevalent across the Danish data and in the American cross-
examinations, but virtually absent in the American direct examinations.
 Analysing contextualised examples from the Danish as well as the 
American trials illustrates that declarative questions, typically realising 
communicative speech acts, are interactionally versatile and a valuable 
communicative resource, at least when discussed in relation to the Danish data. 
Th is may explain their extensive use in the Danish examinations. However, 
their underrepresentation in the American data, I argue, may be linked to 
the observation that declarative questions appear to be used (also) for other, 
more directly confrontational purposes in the American data, perhaps partly 
due to a seemingly diff erent meaning potential. In this connection, I suggest 
that declarative questions, in a Danish courtroom context, may not be a highly 
controlling question type as such.
 Finally, I argue that legal – in addition to more general – cultural diff erences 
between the United States and Denmark can also help explain the diff erent 
distributions of declarative questions, as the Danish hybridised adversarial 
system of trial can more naturally incorporate metacommunication than the 
American prototype adversarial trial system.
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 Generally, the comparison contributes to a better understanding of the interactional 
mechanisms of courtroom questioning – from a Danish perspective by merely opening 
a topic that has been more or less neglected so far, and from a broader forensic linguistics 
perspective by shedding new light on one of the most dreaded question types in the 
adversarial courtroom.
Appendix 1: Quantitative overview, DK1
Appendix 2: Quantitative overview, DK2
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Appendix 3: Quantitative overview, DK3
Appendix 4: Quantitative overview, US and DK data
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Appendix 5: Transcription conventions 
Identifi er  DFL:
Pause, measured in seconds (0.2)
 (.) indicates pause shorter than 0.1 seconds
Pause, US1 transcript -- 
Prolonged vowel or consonant uh: (more colons indicate greater 
 prolongation)
Unfi nished word an aggr- aggressive appearance  
Inaudible  xxx
Anonymised item [NAME] 
Contextual information [A ssumingly defendant is visually pointed   
 out in court]  
 
Notes 
1 I am grateful for the fi nancial support given to this work by Th e Danish Council 
for Independent Research: project ID DFF – 1321-00180. Also, I would like to 
thank the anonymous reviewer for insightful comments to a previous version of 
the paper. 
2  In the example excerpts, defence lawyers are abbreviated DFL, defence witnesses 
DFW, prosecutors PRC, prosecution witnesses PRW and defendants DEF. Note 
that defendants are featured only in the Danish data. (In American trials it is quite
 common for defendants not to give live testimony.) For general transcription 
conventions, cf. appendix 5.
3 In the example excerpts, red colour indicates utterances or words intended for 
particular analytical attention.
4 Th is example is taken from the Danish data as no occurrences of this question type 
were found in the American data. Th roughout the paper, English translations of 
Danish examples are displayed in grey colour.
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5 More specifi cally, direct examination/examination-in-chief – is the ‘friendly’, 
constructive questioning of same-side witnesses, i.e. the questioning of the 
defendant by the defence lawyer, the questioning of the complainant by the 
prosecutor, or of any other witnesses called by the side conducting the questioning.
 Cross-examination is the ‘hostile’, de(con)structive questioning of opposing 
witnesses, i.e. the questioning of the defendant by the prosecutor, the questioning
 of the complainant by the defence lawyer, or of any other witnesses called by the 
opposing side. Typically, cross-examination follows direct examination, except for
 the defendant’s examination, which is initiated by the prosecutor (see Cotterill 
2003:128ff  for an extensive introduction and discussion).
6  DK1 has previously been treated, from a diff erent perspective, in Mortensen and 
Mortensen (2017). DK3 was collected, transcribed and studied, also from other 
perspectives, by a student project group under my supervision, cf. Crone et al. 
(2018).
7 Bednarek (2014:184ff ) straightforwardly compares the question types employed 
in her American and Polish data, on the basis of an English question typology 
off ered by Quirk et al. (1985).
8 Combinations of syntactic forms are not invariantly classifi ed as ‘other/
indeterminable’, as parts of these are in some cases clearly the result of e.g. false 
starts, or belong to prefatory statements, not included in the actual question.
9 While imperative questions are not accounted for in Archer’s model, they are 
discussed or mentioned in several other studies of courtroom questioning, 
including Danet and Bogoch (1980), Bülow-Moller (1992), Seuren (2019), yet 
mostly in anecdotal terms and without clear relation to the more central question
 types. Since the data analysed here contain very few examples of imperatives, I 
do not treat them individually as a question type, but include them in the ‘other/
indeterminable’ category, cf. appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4.
10 Th e possibility of double classifi cation does not apply to constative questions, 
as they are mutually exclusive from communicative questions, which are 
metacommunicative as opposed to constatives, as well as from regulative questions,
 which impose obligations or permissions to act, as opposed to constatives.
11  ‘Counsel’ refers collectively to prosecutors and defence lawyers.
 12 It should be noted that a total absence of declarative questions is hardly 
representative of typical American direct examinations. Seuren (2019), studying 
direct examinations in the George Zimmerman trial (featuring a total of 649 
questions), fi nds a frequency of 11.4% declarative questions (Seuren 2019:344). 
Bednarek (2014), studying the O.J. Simpson criminal trial (featuring a total of 5,106 
questions), fi nds a frequency of 9.5% declarative questions in direct examinations 
(Bednarek 2014:94ff ). Still, even a 10-11% frequency of declarative questions 
would be very low compared to the Danish data. 
13 Th e minor group of questions classifi ed as communicative and regulative are 
counted and treated as communicative questions. In the data overviews off ered in
 the appendices, occurrences of ‘secondary’ regulative functions are presented in 
superscript parentheses following the fi gures for the communicative questions.
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14 Th e Danish data feature 220 other-clarifi cations out of 242 communicative 
questions, i.e. 91%. Th e American data feature 17 other-clarifi cations out of 27 
communicative questions, i.e. 63%. Th e Danish direct examinations feature 
113 other-clarifi cations out of 128 communicative questions, i.e. 88%, whereas 
the American direct examinations feature just 1 other-clarifi cation out of 7 
communicative questions, i.e. 14%, cf. appendix 4.
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